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In the field of public family law we find a number of laws that go for options not
obligations, for choice not command. One example relates to the Elterngeld, i.e. the
monthly childcare benefit that allows parents to stay at home with their newborn:
The claim period of the allowance is 14 months. However, one parent’s eligibility
is restricted to 12 months. The period is extended to 14 months only if the second
parent likewise stays at home for at least two months – the so-called partner months
(Section 4 (3) BEEG). I am not sure if Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler, the
authors of “Nudge”, would see this regulation as a nudge. They might rather call it an
incentive. Either way, the partner months can be seen as a variant form of libertarian
paternalism. The legislator explicitly conceived the partner months as “an incentive
for parents not to assign family work to the one and employment to the other part”.
From a constitutional point of view, the partner months raise the question of their
compatibility with fundamental rights. They have actually been subject to several
disputes before the courts. Parents claimed that the legislation is incompatible with
the basic law as it puts a limit to their freedom. In German constitutional law, a
violation of a constitutional liberty is determined in three steps. In a first step, we ask
if there is a fundamental right whose area of protection is affected by the measure
in question. At this stage, most courts agreed that the partner months fall within the
scope of Article 6 Section 1 and 2 of the basic law. In its classical meaning as a right
of defense against intrusions by the state, Article 6 protects the citizens’ freedom to
independently choose how to lead their family lives.
In a second step, we ask whether the measure in question interferes with the
fundamental right. This is clearly the most specific question with regard to the partner
months as well as to incentives and nudges in general. However, when the courts
determined whether the partner months put a limit to the parents’ freedom they came
to very different conclusions:
A regional social court held that the partner months interfere with fundamental rights.
It stated that the freedom of making choices with regard to family life would “not be
restricted only if a decision was made formally impossible or if it was prevented with
(nearly) irresistible pressure”. But freedom was “limited already when the state (…)
links disadvantages to a certain kind of decision”.
Another regional social court, in contrast, did not find that the partner months
encroach upon a fundamental right: “Whether one or both parents interrupt their
career and chose the partner months is left to their own decision. (…) The partner
months provide an offer (…) that can be accepted or refused. It does not irresistibly
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urge parents to behave in a certain way, because it does not force them, neither
legally nor factually, to make a certain decision.” The Federal Social Court agreed:
“The partner months may have influence on how parents assume their parental
responsibility.” Nevertheless, “the parents’ freedom of choice (…) is not affected in a
constitutionally relevant way”. The law did not exercise “forbidden coercion” but did
“merely create incentives”.
The Federal Constitutional Court, too, has delivered two decisions on the partner
months. But unfortunately, they do not add any flesh to the bones when it comes to
the general question of the relevance of incentives and nudges under constitutional
law. The Court left open whether the partner months interfere with fundamental
rights and just held that the legislation was “in any case” justified.
I will come back to the question of justification later. But first, I would like to explain
why, in my view, justification is actually needed: Article 6 protects a free space in
which individuals are meant to make decisions as they please. Therefore, it is not
sufficient if the state leaves options open for the parents. In my view, in order to
determine whether what I call behavioral legislation interferes with Article 6 one
has to adopt a behavioral approach that includes considerations regarding the
principle of equality: If alternative ways of behavior are attached with different legal
consequences, this constitutes an interference with Article 6. One might consider
it crucial to what extent different options of behavior were differently treated. But
this does not convince me when we are talking about legislation with the sole aim of
changing behavior. The extent of unequal treatment can be taken account of at step
three: More serious interferences require more weighty reasons for justification.
This brings me back to the question of justification, the third step. With regard to the
partner months only, I could just say that I am with the Federal Constitutional Court:
The partner months do not violate fundamental rights because they are suitable to
serve the constitutional obligation to “promote the actual implementation of equal
rights for women and men”. However, I would like to draw attention to one aspect
that seems important with regard to the question of the justification of incentives and
nudges in general. Writing on the legitimacy of nudging, Thaler and Sunstein discuss
an aspect that German constitutional lawyers would locate at step three: Namely,
the aims of nudges. Thaler and Sunstein claim that the paternalistic aspect of their
concept is legitimate because nudges aim at making people’s “lives longer, healthier,
and better”. Nudges would influence decisions in a way „that will make choosers
better off, as judged by themselves“.
I doubt that this approach is applicable under German constitutional law. The
basic law’s concept of constitutional liberties is difficult to reconcile with an idea
of citizens who need to be told by the state what is better for them. Also, I do not
see how the legislator can even know what the individuals’ interests are. He can
rather know – or better: democratically determine – what the public interest is.
Accordingly, the Federal Constitutional Court held that the partner months were
justified, because they were suitable to break down traditional role assignments with
their discriminating effects in the labor market. It rightly did not base its argument on
the idea that the partner months would serve the parents’ individual interest in having
equal – or better – partnerships. In other words: Insofar as nudges and incentives
- 2 -
affect fundamental rights, the government has to invoke public interests and cannot
justify its measures on grounds of the assumed interests of the addressees.
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